

REALIGNMENT, REGION, AND RACE

Presidential Leadership and
Social Identity

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Presidential Leadership and
Social Identity

BY

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United Kingdom – North America – Japan
India – Malaysia – China

Emerald Publishing Limited
Howard House, Wagon Lane, Bingley BD16 1WA, UK

First edition 2018

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British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data

A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library

ISBN: 978-1-78743-792-0 (Print)

ISBN: 978-1-78743-791-3 (Online)

ISBN: 978-1-78743-980-1 (Epub)



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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I am grateful to many people who have supported and sustained my interest in political history and presidential leadership. At the University of Richmond, I especially appreciate the discussions I've had with Scott Allison, Julian Hayter, and Daniel Palazzolo. Two wonderful students, Abby Huth and Matt Logan, were especially helpful. My confidants Stephen Hayes and Steve Young have consistently offered encouragement, and most important they have listened. Jim Shaw's occasional interruptions have always been refreshing. Family and friends at Raquette Lake provide the buoyancy needed to carry on. Thank you.

Elizabeth DeBusk-Maslanka has unfailingly provided cheerful editorial advice, research, and organization. I am deeply indebted to her. Other sustaining support has been offered by my colleagues Michele Bedsaul, Shannon Best, Jessica Flanigan, Javier Hidalgo, Crystal Hoyt, Don Forsyth, Peter Kaufman, Pam Khoury, Gary McDowell, Sandra Peart, Terry Price, Susan Taylor, Stephanie Trent, and Thad Williamson.

At Emerald, I want to thank Charlotte Maiorana for her initial interest in this project, and her support throughout. Also, Nick Wolterman has effectively guided the book through the production process, and I am grateful.

Members of my family help tremendously by who they are, and by their wise understanding, especially Jefferson, Meagan, Andrew, and Vanessa. Most of all, I thank BB for her interest and support every single day. And truly, Tennyson Rose lights up my life. I am grateful for her timely arrival.

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CHAPTER 1

THE REALIGNMENT OF AMERICAN POLITICS

In 1860, the six-year-old Republican Party won its first presidential election. Abraham Lincoln of Illinois, in many ways a compromise candidate, easily prevailed over a divided opposition — a split Democratic Party and a third “Constitutional Union” party. Lincoln, the Republican, decisively won all of the 18 “free states” but equally dramatically lost all of the 15 slave states. One hundred and forty years later, in 2000, the pattern was very different. In a close election, Republican George W. Bush lost all but three of the 1860 free states to Democrat Al Gore, yet won all but two of the 15 former slave states. Many Northern states that had been Republican since the party’s founding had switched to the Democrats. The region that had been the Democrat’s Solid South for a century after the Civil War had become overwhelmingly red, or Republican. In a similar pattern eight years later, Barack Obama, the Democratic candidate, won all of the 1860 free states, but lost 10 of the former slave states to the Republican candidate, John McCain. What happened? Had the political proclivities of North and South

reversed themselves, or had the parties changed positions on issues that divided the regions?¹

This book tells the story of how and why the North and South switched political parties. It also outlines how the alignments of the Farm, Mountain, and Southwest states that came into the Union after the start of the Civil War have evolved. Initially, however, our focus is on the 33 states that cast ballots in 1860, the election that precipitated secession and civil war. How do we understand the remarkable transformation of party alignment in these two large sections of the American political landscape? The short answer, I contend, is racial dynamics. Furthermore, these racial dynamics are perpetuated largely by social identity concerns; that is, people's need to have their political leaders validate themselves and the groups by which they define themselves. For many years, white social identity in the South, but not the North, was based on beliefs in white privilege, superiority, and supremacy. Challenges or alternatives to a Southern social identity based on white superiority were fiercely resisted.

Regional differences on race and other issues are tied to enduring human motives, which rise and fall in importance according to a range of economic, international, and social conditions. Chief among these motives are needs for safety, prosperity, and self-validation. As suggested above, the need for a positive sense of self-esteem based in large part on a positive social or group identity has had an overriding influence in many presidential elections since our nation's founding. Parties and politicians that have offered people a positive sense of identity by defining them as a distinct group among others in the population and endorsing the validity of their customs, needs, anxieties, and aspirations have won their votes. In many instances, parties or politicians have offered either white supremacy or white privilege tied to white

aspirations as an element of a positive social identity. We will discuss several traditions within social psychology that have explored the importance of social identity and the way leaders shape and validate it in order to influence followers and potential followers. For the moment, highly relevant is Howard Gardner's proposition that leaders best influence their fellow human beings by the stories they relate, and that the most powerful such stories are about a group's identity: where it has come from, where it is going, what "is to be feared, struggled against, and dreamed about" (Gardner, 1995).

1.1. ORIENTING FRAMEWORK

This history of the alignment and realignment of America's regions with the two major political parties, Democrats and Republicans, rests on several generalized beliefs or assumptions about the country's geography, political system, and the psychology of leadership. Making these beliefs explicit will help frame the discussion of regions, identity, race, and alignment that follows, and will clarify the changing pattern of party support that has defined the US political history.

- People in different sections of the country have differed in their political interests and beliefs from the founding of the 13 British colonies in North America to the present. There have been significant divergences in regional values and priorities that at times have meant that there has been conflict between regions. Those differences are related to both geography and the culture of the people who founded each section, and to each section's resulting economy. The most consistent differences have been between the Northeast and the South. Other regions, such as the

Midwest, the West Coast, or Farm or Mountain states, have at times been aligned with the Northeast and at other times with the South. Linked to the cultures of the various regions are enduring social identities, often containing self-serving comparisons to people from other regions.

- For all of US history, race has been perhaps the most significant cause of sectional tension and conflict. Though disagreements pertaining to racial justice have varied in prominence relative to other issues, they have been a constant element in American politics. Northern and Southern differences regarding slavery challenged American unity during the Revolutionary War from 1775 to 1783, and the framing of the Constitution in 1787. Regional conflict over rights for African-Americans persisted until it finally brought about the Civil War, followed by continuing divergences during Reconstruction, the Jim Crow era, and through mid-twentieth-century battles over civil rights and voting rights. At present, race seems to be an increasing source of conflict within the whole of American society.
- While the two major political parties have switched positions on support for African-Americans and racial justice, both parties have historically contained a spectrum of political opinion regarding race and other issues. There are more than two political philosophies within the country, so that at any given time, each party has included several different perspectives or emphases within it. Republicans have often been divided by those whose main focus has been supporting big business, versus those who have championed government efforts to support equal opportunity. One persuasive view of the Republican Party holds that while most presidents from the Grand Old Party

(or GOP) have favored corporate and business interests, notable exceptions have been Abraham Lincoln, Theodore Roosevelt, and Dwight D. Eisenhower (Richardson, 2014). Differences within the Democratic Party have at times diverted it from its fundamental commitments to the common man.

- There are different cultures and identities within regions as well as between regions. Like all social identities, they often include negative stereotypes of those who look, think, and act differently. Whether self-serving “ingroup” identities contain negative views of “outgroups” inside or outside a given region, those derogatory views can lead to and justify discriminatory behavior and violence. Throughout our history, negative views of African-Americans have been a part of the identity of different white groups, and have justified slavery, disenfranchisement, and lynching, among other forms of injustice.
- Human beings generally have multiple motives and multiple individual and social identities. Lyndon Johnson, the 36th president of the United States once wrote “I am a free man, a US Senator, and a Democrat, in that order” (Johnson, 1958). He went on to note that he was “a liberal, a conservative, a Texan, a taxpayer, a rancher, a businessman, a consumer, a parent, a voter ...” Leaders can play an important role in making salient different motives, different values, or different facets of our many identities, and mobilizing us toward furthering those values, motives, or identities. An important implication of prominent leadership theories is that potential leaders offer identity stories for potential followers and that those stories compete with other stories to shape how followers think, feel, and act. Different stories engage different

motives, make different values salient, and define who followers are in different ways. A potential leader's story relates where a group of followers has come from, where it is going, what obstacles and adversaries it faces, and how it can achieve its goals.

- Things change. The challenges that the nation as a whole faces are continually evolving. The same is true within different regions or sections. Also, the stories American leaders and American parties relate, by word or example, change, as the dynamics of political parties change. Perhaps, most significant is the change in people's hearts and minds about what is important, what is urgent, and what is right. Political leaders have had a profound and highly varied influence on who people think they are, and accordingly, what they think is paramount.
- Very importantly, African-Americans play a central in the history of party realignment. They both shaped and were shaped by the politics of both Democrats and Republicans.

1.2. A CENTURY OF ALIGNMENT TRANSITION: AN OVERVIEW

When Abraham Lincoln ran for president in 1860, Northern and Southern states differed enough on race and slavery to bring on civil war. But the regions had differed on those, and, to be sure, other issues, long before, from the founding of the Republic. Before the Civil War, regional differences in politics were largely about economic policy and the relative power of the states and the federal government. While those issues were often tied to economies based on slave labor versus free labor, explicit or overt arguments about slavery were

sporadic. They took center stage in conflicts leading up to the compromises of 1820 and 1850, and then between the introduction of the Kansas–Nebraska Act in 1854 and secession in 1860 and 1861, but otherwise they remained on the sidelines. After the war, differences related to race continued to divide North and South. Reconstruction, Jim Crow, civil rights, voting rights divided those two regions from the 1860s through the 1960s. As in the pre-Civil War period, issues related to race became more or less central and explicit at different times during the post-civil war century. Since the 1960s, race has been a powerful dynamic, though less explicitly so, until the present.

When between the 1860s and 1960s did the GOP lose its traditional dominance in the North, and when did the South begin to break away from the Democratic Party? It is instructive to look at the results of three close elections — 1916, 1948, and 1960. All the three elections were won by Democrats — Woodrow Wilson, Harry Truman, and John F. Kennedy — and all three followed the 1860 pattern, but to a lesser extent each time. In 1916, the Republican candidate Charles Evans Hughes carried 15 of Lincoln’s 18 free states, while Wilson carried 14 of the 15 slave states of 1860 — losing only Delaware. In 1948, Republican Thomas E. Dewey won 10 of the 1860 free states, but lost eight to Truman. Yet Dewey won only Delaware and Maryland of the 15 former slave states. Nine of the others were carried by Truman. Segregationist third-party candidate Strom Thurmond won four more: South Carolina, Alabama, Mississippi, and Louisiana. Across both elections, the free states had become not so uniformly Republican, but the South was still almost exclusively anti-GOP. In 1960, both Kennedy and his Republican opponent Richard Nixon won nine of the free states, while Nixon won only four former slave states. By that year the GOP hold on the free states was slipping, but

the South remained more or less solidly Democratic. As we shall see, the dramatic realignment that was in place by 2000 began to take shape shortly after Kennedy's victory in 1960.

A more nuanced look at groupings of the states taking part in Lincoln's 1860 victory will help us understand the weakening, but not breaking, of the 1860 alignment over the next century. As noted, Lincoln won all 18 free states; that is, states that did not allow slavery. Those 18 included 11 "Upper North" states (the six New England states, plus New York, Michigan, Wisconsin, Iowa, and Minnesota), five "Lower North" states (New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Ohio, Indiana, and Illinois), and two Western states, California, and Oregon.² In a four-way race, Lincoln won the *majority* of the popular votes in all 11 Upper North states and in all except New Jersey among the five Lower North states. His largest majorities were in the six New England states. His *plurality* in New Jersey (48.1 percent of the popular vote) was substantial. In contrast to the Upper and Lower North pattern, Lincoln won by only slim pluralities in California and Oregon.

In contrast, all 15 slave states voted for someone else. Eleven were captured by the Southern Democratic candidate, John C. Breckinridge of Kentucky, the incumbent vice president of the United States. These included the seven "Lower South" states, which seceded from the Union after Lincoln's election but before his inauguration in March 1861 (in order of secession, South Carolina, Mississippi, Florida, Alabama, Georgia, Louisiana, and Texas), two "Upper South" states that seceded after the Confederate attack on Fort Sumter in April 1861 (North Carolina and Arkansas), and two slaveholding "border states" that did not secede from the Union (Maryland and Delaware). Third-party Constitutional Union candidate John Bell carried the Upper North states of Virginia and Tennessee, which seceded after Fort Sumter and

the “border state” Kentucky, which did not secede. Northern Democratic Candidate Stephen A. Douglas, like Lincoln, from Illinois, won only border state Missouri. Lincoln was not listed on the ballot in the seven Lower South states, and only in Virginia among the Upper South states (where he got 1.1 percent of the vote). He was listed on the ballots in the four border states, but received very few votes in any of them. Going forward, the six 1860 groupings we have noted will be convenient reference points: the states of the Upper North, Lower North, Border, Upper South, Lower South, and West Coast.

1.3. THE FREE STATES BECOME LESS REPUBLICAN

First let’s take an overview of the loosening grip of the Republican Party on the 1860 free states during the next century. It is best seen in close elections, those where the national popular vote margin was less than 6 percent. The first such election was 1868, the first after the end of the Civil War. Ulysses S. Grant won with a popular margin of 5.4 percent. Grant lost the free states of New York, New Jersey, and Oregon. Those losses were not particularly surprising. Grant’s Democratic opponent, Horatio Seymour, was the conservative governor of New York, the state with the largest population and most electoral votes. In 1860, neither New Jersey nor Oregon had been as pro-Lincoln as most of the other free states, and in 1864 New Jersey actually voted for Lincoln’s Democratic opponent, who happened to be former Union General George B. McClellan, future Governor of New Jersey. Grant’s re-election in 1872 was not close, but the next six, from 1876 through 1896 were extremely close. The Democrats won New Jersey in all six of those elections, Connecticut in four of them, and New York and Indiana in

three. They made their largest gains among the free states in the 1892 election, when Democrat Grover Cleveland was returned to the White House, after winning the election of 1884 but losing his bid for re-election in 1888. That year, 1892, the Democratic Party won New Jersey, Connecticut, New York, and Indiana as they had in several previous elections, but also three free states further west — Illinois, Wisconsin, and California. It is important to note that in the four elections noted above in which Democrats carried New York, the Democratic candidates were all governors or former governors of that state — Horatio Seymour in 1868, Samuel J. Tilden in 1876, and Grover Cleveland in 1884 and 1892. Furthermore, as we shall see, governors or former governors of New York were major party nominees in nine of the 12 elections between 1904 and 1948. Not surprisingly, both parties often turned to candidates from the state with the most electoral votes. Finally, we should keep in mind that the inroads that the Democrats were making into the free states was completely reversed in 1896 when they nominated populist-leaning and charismatic William Jennings Bryan, the “boy orator of the Platte.” All the free states voted for the Republican William McKinley that year. Democrats wouldn’t win Northern states again until years later when those states and the Democrats both began to move in the progressive direction.

The next four elections after 1896 were not close. Republicans McKinley, Theodore Roosevelt, and William Howard Taft won easily in 1900, 1904, and 1908. They carried all of the free states. In 1912, Democrat Woodrow Wilson won easily, but only because of the GOP split, enabling Wilson to prevail in a three-way race over Republican rivals Theodore Roosevelt and William Howard Taft. The split gave Wilson 13 of the 18 free states, though he did not win the majority of the popular vote in any of them.

His percentages varied from a high of 43 percent in Indiana to a low of 34 percent in Oregon.

The year 1916 was the first close race after 1896. Wilson narrowly defeated Republican Charles Evans Hughes. In doing so he won three free states, with very small pluralities in New Hampshire (56 popular votes!) and California, along with a slim majority in Ohio. The Republicans swept the next three elections nationally in landslides under Warren Harding in 1920, Calvin Coolidge in 1924, and Herbert Hoover in 1928. With two notable 1928 exceptions, they won all of the free states handily in those elections. Those exceptions constitute the first sign of slippage in the GOP's twentieth-century hegemony in the free states. Although Hoover won a landslide victory over Democrat Al Smith in 1928, two New England states, Massachusetts and Rhode Island, voted Democratic. Rhode Island had not voted for a Democrat since 1852. Massachusetts had *never* voted Democratic. As we shall see, in subsequent years those two states, along with Minnesota, would become the most consistently Democratic states in the nation.

As noted, 1948 was the next close election in the century 1860–1960. That year, Harry Truman defeated former New York governor Thomas E. Dewey. In doing so, Truman held on to eight of the 1860 free states that had generally supported Franklin D. Roosevelt in his decisive victories in 1932, 1936, 1940, and 1944. Truman won Massachusetts and Rhode Island, as Al Smith and FDR had, plus Ohio, Illinois, Wisconsin, Minnesota, Iowa, and California. Then in the extremely close election of 1960, John F. Kennedy captured Truman's 1948 free states, except Ohio, Wisconsin, and California, and added Connecticut, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, and Michigan. Thus, 12 of the 1860 free states voted for either Truman or Kennedy or both in the narrow Democratic victories of 1948 and 1960. Those 12 states (Massachusetts, Rhode Island, Connecticut, New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania,

Ohio, Michigan, Illinois, Wisconsin, Minnesota, and California) would become the backbone of the realignment that made the free states largely Democratic until the election of 2016. In short, by 1960 the 1860 free states were not overwhelmingly Republican. Democrats were becoming more and more competitive.

1.4. SOME SLAVE STATES ABANDON DEMOCRATS

The Democratic Party's hold on the Solid South, still mostly intact through the election of 1960, began slipping later than the Republicans' hold on the 1860 free states. This slippage is best illustrated by focusing on the 11 states that became the Confederate States of America during the Civil War. In the three presidential elections after the end of the war, when African-Americans were able to vote in large numbers, several former Confederate states voted for Republicans Ulysses S. Grant in 1868 and 1872, and Rutherford B. Hayes in the contested election of 1876. By 1880, voting by African-Americans had largely been suppressed in the South and that year Democrats carried all 11 Confederate states, both the seven Lower South states that seceded first, and the four Upper South states that left the Union after Fort Sumter. Furthermore, the Democrats carried every Confederate state in the next nine presidential elections, through 1916. The first crack in that Southern alignment occurred in 1920. Tennessee voted for the Republican Warren G. Harding (and his notable running mate, Calvin Coolidge), just barely, as Harding cruised to a landslide victory nationally. The other 10 Confederate states voted for the Democrat, James M. Cox (and his notable running mate, Franklin D. Roosevelt). In 1924, Tennessee returned to the fold and all 11 Confederate states voted for Democrat John W. Davis. Unfortunately for the

Democrats and the Solid South, Davis was overwhelmed nationally by Calvin Coolidge and the Republicans.

The 1928 election produced Southern defections from the Democrats which anticipated some of the breakaways that we shall see in the 1952, 1956, and 1960 elections. It also showed which states constituted the “solidest South.” That year, as noted, conservative Republican Herbert Hoover won another GOP landslide, in this case over liberal Democrat Al Smith. In doing so, Hoover carried the former Upper South states of Tennessee, Virginia, and North Carolina, as well as Florida and Texas. Smith held on to South Carolina, Georgia, Alabama, Mississippi, Louisiana, and Arkansas. A significant dynamic involved religion. Al Smith was a Roman Catholic. The Ku Klux Klan had become ascendant again in the 1920s, after being diminished in the late 1800s, and was a force within the Democratic Party. It opposed Catholics as well as African-Americans and Jews. One KKK sign of the era read “KKK: Kill Koons, Kikes and Catholics.” Furthermore, Smith was a “wet,” someone opposed to the prohibition against “the manufacture, sale or transportation” of “intoxicating” beverages enshrined in the 18th amendment to the US Constitution, ratified by the states in 1919. Many Southern states were “dry” and the combination of Smith’s Catholicism, affiliation with the “wets” and his strong New York accent hurt him among many Southerners. We should note again that the 1928 election produced the first defections from the GOP in the Northeast. Al Smith carried Massachusetts and Rhode Island, but just barely. Both states had significant Catholic populations.

The Great Depression of the 1930s and the political skills of Democrat Franklin D. Roosevelt enabled Roosevelt to win landslide or at least decisive victories in the elections of 1932, 1936, 1940, and 1944. FDR carried from at least 12 to at most 16 of the 18 free states in those four elections, and he also

consistently carried all of the 15 slave states, both former Confederate states and the border states which held slaves but did not secede during the Civil War. However, the election of 1948 showed increasing Southern restiveness within the Democratic Party. As noted above, none of the former Confederate states voted Republican in 1948. There was no indication that the party would welcome segregationist, white supremacist constituencies. But four of those Southern states (South Carolina, Alabama, Mississippi, and Louisiana) were unhappy enough with Harry Truman's support for civil rights initiatives to bolt for Strom Thurmond's States Rights Democratic, or Dixiecrat, Party. Those four states had the largest percentage of disenfranchised African-American citizens in the nation, and some of the deepest segregationist traditions.

The defection of former slave states from the Democrats continued in Adlai Stevenson's landslide losses to Dwight D. Eisenhower's in 1952 and 1956. Ike carried seven of the 15 in 1952 and eight in 1956. The ones that remained Democratic in both years included the most resolutely Deep South states of South Carolina, Georgia, Alabama, and Mississippi, plus North Carolina and Arkansas. Then in 1960, when Kennedy ran against Richard Nixon, North and South Carolina, Georgia, and Arkansas remained with the Democrats, and JFK reclaimed Louisiana and Texas and the border states of Missouri, Maryland, and Delaware. By 1960, the South was not so solid, but it was still more Democratic than Republican. That all changed in the next election.

1.5. CIVIL RIGHTS, GOLDWATER, AND THE TIPPING POINT: THE DEEP SOUTH VOTES REPUBLICAN

Thus far we have focused on close elections. The election of 1964, in which Lyndon B. Johnson defeated Barry

Goldwater, was anything but close. But that extremely important contest was the inflexion point, the year in which the heart of the South permanently threw over its allegiance to the Democratic Party and began its embrace of the GOP. The cause was race. John F. Kennedy was assassinated in November 1963. As we shall see, his successor, Lyndon Johnson of Texas, dramatically embraced the sweeping civil rights bill that Kennedy had introduced to the congress several months before his death. With great skill, Johnson moved the bill through Congress, and it was signed into law in the summer of 1964. When Johnson ran for president on his own months later, his Republican opponent was conservative Senator Barry Goldwater of Arizona. Goldwater had opposed the civil rights bill as fiercely as Johnson had pushed for it. For his efforts, five of the seven states that created the Confederate States of America in early 1861, voted Republican: South Carolina, Georgia, Alabama, Mississippi, and Louisiana. Since 1880, *none* of those states had voted Republican, except for Louisiana in 1956. With rare exceptions, those states would never vote Democrat again. They are now among the reddest states in the nation. In the pages to follow, we will explain just how this transformation of region and party evolved.

1.6. AMERICAN NATIONS AND THE POLITICS OF RACE

Thus far we have referred to 1860 free states and slave states. Later we suggested that we could get a fuller understanding of region and politics by distinguishing within those groupings “Upper North” and “Lower North” free states as well as “Upper South” and “Lower South” slave states. The eight Upper South states eventually divided themselves into four

border states, which held slaves but did not secede from the Union (Delaware, Maryland, Kentucky, and Missouri) and four other states that seceded after the beginning of the Civil War in April of 1861. The latter four states — Virginia, North Carolina, Tennessee, and Arkansas — joined the seven original Confederate states — South Carolina, Georgia, Florida, Alabama, Mississippi, Louisiana, and Texas — after President Abraham Lincoln called for 75,000 volunteers for 90-day enlistments to suppress the rebellion that began at Fort Sumter.

An influential and insightful book by Colin Woodard, *American Nations: A History of the Eleven Rival Regional Cultures of North America*, characterizes those convenient Upper and Lower North and South groupings as fundamentally misleading. Woodard identifies what he calls 11 “nations” or cultures based on their different histories within North America. At the time of the American Revolution, six nations arrayed along the Atlantic Coast and in the Appalachian Mountains defined the United States. In order of their founding by Europeans they include what Woodard calls Tidewater, Yankeedom, New Amsterdam, the Deep South, the Midlands, and Greater Appalachia. His analysis of these varied histories help us understand the politics of regions within the United States, especially the politics of the South.

Tidewater was settled first, at Jamestown in what is now Virginia, in 1607. The early settlers in Tidewater were conservative “Cavaliers” with close ties to the British monarchy. They were bound by tradition, and honored authority. The gentlemen Cavaliers did not intend to be farmers, or workers of any sort, but they were forced to by circumstance. Soon, labor was imported from England in the form of indentured servants, who would work for an owner or master for a period of time, usually seven years, and thereby earn their freedom. Throughout the 1600s, the supply of this form of

labor varied with economic conditions in the mother country. When the British economy lagged, it was hard for people in lower social classes to find work, and many were enticed by the promise of eventual freedom in the British colony in North America. England was happy to let them go, until prosperity again increased the demand for their labor at home.

Slavery was introduced in the Tidewater region, and thus the Americas, in 1619, when a British ship that had intercepted a Portuguese slave trader brought 20 or so African captives to Point Comfort, Virginia. The status of the captives raised a variety of questions for the English settlers. They had become Christians, and therefore, according to prevailing norms, could not become slaves. Many became indentured servants working alongside white laborers (Davis, 2006). Eventually, however, slavery based on color became the prevailing form of labor in the colony, although there was always a sizeable number of free blacks. It is important to note that while slavery was not envisioned as the foundation for colony economy in 1607, the lucrative cultivation of tobacco and other forms of labor-intensive agriculture quickly led to its dominance.

Pronounced class distinctions in England came across the Atlantic very much intact. The Virginia Tidewater was marked by aristocratic pretensions and practices. Those qualities are seen today in such terms as First Families of Virginia, or, more familiarly, FFVs. Not surprisingly, many of the central figures in the emergence of the United States as an independent country with a republican form of government were from the Tidewater elite. Four of the first five US presidents — George Washington, Thomas Jefferson, James Madison, and James Monroe — to varying degrees, came from those classes.

Woodard's "Yankeedom" arrived on American shores a few years later. The Pilgrims arrived in Plymouth, Massachusetts in 1620, and the Puritans arrived in Boston in another decade or so. Having become alienated from the Church of England, they fled England for ideals of religious freedom, and nurtured the Congregational church in New England. They believed in broad participation in local governance and valued education and equality. However, they did not welcome dissent within their own religious traditions. They were comfortable with strong government, and believed that government should operate for the benefit and improvement of its constituents. Interestingly, differences and tensions between the Tidewater and Yankeedom English colonies were revealed in their allegiances during the British Civil Wars of the 1640s and 1650s. The Tidewater aristocrats were royalists, supporting King Charles I, who was deposed and beheaded in 1649 by the supporters of Oliver Cromwell. Yankee Congregationalists had long opposed the British crown and supported the revolutionaries. In large part because the geography of New England did not demand slave labor for farm production, slavery never took hold in Yankeedom as it had done in the Tidewater.

Woodard calls the third American nation to emerge on the Atlantic coast "New Netherland." It evolved from the Dutch colony of New Amsterdam founded in 1624 on Manhattan Island in what is now New York City. Henry Hudson had first explored that region for the Dutch in 1609 and over the next 15 years Hollanders established a trading post and fort on the tip of Manhattan. New Amsterdam became New York in 1664 when the British and Dutch agreed to transfer that colony to English rule in exchange for Holland being given control of valuable islands in the Caribbean. The population of the settlement from the very beginning was multi-ethnic, highly commercial, and valued openness and

inclusion. Commerce with the interior of North America and across the oceans was its lifeblood. The colony included many slaves, and New Amsterdam welcomed a bustling slave trade. Woodard argues that “Full-on slavery was introduced to what is now the United States not by the gentlemen planters of Virginia or South Carolina but by the merchants of Manhattan” (p. 71). Even after New Netherland fell under British political control, it never gave up its emphasis on commerce, trade, finance, immigration, and multi-ethnicity from the Dutch era (Shorto, 2004). Woodard argues that the current “nation” of New Netherland, now contained in a small geographic area around present-day New York City, traces its values and mores to the Dutch-era New Amsterdam.

In chronological order, the fourth “nation” Woodard describes is called “Deep South.” Its origin as a British colony needs to be understood in terms of the history of England’s possession of Barbados in the Caribbean Sea. An English ship claimed Barbados in 1625 and the first white settlers arrived two years later. Barbados soon became a prosperous sugar colony, worked by African slaves (Stuart, 2012). By 1660, slaves outnumbered white planters and other settlers, and from then on the black population steadily grew proportionally larger. Small white farmers were put out of business by the owners of large plantations. The planter colony was extremely well-off. Unfortunately for both the planters, and it turned out, African slaves, Barbados is geographically quite small. Englishmen there looked to transport and expand their money-making slave-based sugar economy to other larger lands that could support such agriculture.

Starting in 1671, English Barbadians settled in Charleston, South Carolina. That colony was different from Tidewater in that it was established specifically to support slavery. In contrast, slavery in the Tidewater evolved somewhat by

happenstance. Woodard is unsparing in his characterization of the Deep South: It was:

... founded by Barbados slave lords as a West Indies-style slave society, a system so cruel and despotic that it shocked even its seventeenth-century English contemporaries. For most of American history, the region has been the bastion of white supremacy, aristocratic privilege, and a version of classical Republicanism modeled on the slave states of the ancient world, where democracy was a privilege of the few and enslavement the natural lot of the many. It remains the least democratic of the nations, a one-party entity where race remains the primary determinants of one's political affiliations.

(p. 9)

Since its inception, it:

... would spread rapidly across the lowlands of what is now South Carolina, overwhelming the utopian colony of Georgia and spawning the dominant culture of Mississippi, lowland Alabama, the Louisiana Delta country, eastern Texas and Arkansas, western Tennessee, north Florida, and the southeastern portion of North Carolina.

(p. 82)

In some ways the most varied of Woodard's American nations is the "Midlands." It was founded in the 1680s by Quakers from England. William Penn received a large land grant to begin the colony. Penn's influence is recognized in the name of the state of Pennsylvania, which translates from the Latin as "Penn's woods." The Midlands define Middle America. It is middle class, multi-ethnic and is not dominated

by any political or religious dogma, or by any class culture. In that respect it was always more open than Puritan, Calvinistic Yankeedom, hierarchical Tidewater, or the slave-based Deep South. In American politics it has been very much a swing district. Pennsylvania was actually the first of the United States to outlaw slavery, although abolitionists in the pre-Civil War era were more likely to come from Yankeedom than the Midlands.

The sixth nation we consider at this point is called “Greater Appalachia.” It was originally settled by people Woodard calls “Borderlanders,” who emigrated from Northern England, Scotland, Northern Ireland, and Ireland itself in waves during the 1700s. These people had been in constant warfare with English authorities, English landlords and each other for centuries. They brought individualistic, combative, anti-authority mores to Appalachian regions where they settled. The bulk of them fled their famine-infested and war-devastated homelands to Atlantic ports such as Philadelphia, and finding themselves unwelcome in coastal societies, migrated to unsettled land near and in the Appalachian mountains of southwestern Pennsylvania. From there they spread south into western Maryland, Virginia, and North Carolina as well as the upland sections of South Carolina and Georgia. There they fought Native Americans, British colonial authority, their own legislatures, and, as always, each other.

Not surprisingly, the Hatfields and McCoys of feud fame were from Greater Appalachia, as was Andrew Jackson, the seventh president of the United States. As a teenager near the North Carolina–South Carolina border, Jackson insulted a British officer during the American Revolution, received deep cuts across his forearm and forehead for his troubles, and in 1781 became the only US president who had been a prisoner-of-war. Jackson’s temperament was typical of the region, as

former US Senator James Webb explains in his book about the Scots-Irish in Appalachia, appropriately entitled *Born Fighting* (Webb, 2004).

Greater Appalachia is the only one of Woodard's six original American Nations not to have been founded and settled by agents of the British crown. It was founded by people fleeing that monarchy rather than sponsored by it. Woodard notes the complex role Greater Appalachia played in colonial conflicts with England leading up to the Revolutionary War:

In some regions they would fight in support of Britain, in others, against, but they all did so for the same reason: to resist threats to their clansmen's freedom, be it from Midland merchants, Tidewater gentlemen, Deep Southern planters, or the British crown itself. It was a pattern that would define Appalachia to the present day.

(p. 111)

These six "nations" are the most relevant to understanding partisan realignment in the United States. However, we should mention Woodard's characterization of three other American Nations with a substantial presence in the United States. One is "El Norte," the northern regions of Mexico, much of which was absorbed into the United States with the 1845 annexation of Texas and the "Mexican Cession" of 1848. Today, Hispanics from that nation have a substantial presence in parts of Texas, New Mexico, Arizona, California, and Colorado. A second such nation is the "Left Coast," established mostly by Yankees starting with the 1849 Gold Rush to California. It encompasses the western portions of Washington, Oregon, and California. We will see that in recent years an increasingly liberal Left Coast has played a major role in partisan realignment. Finally, there is the

“Far West,” between the 100th meridian of longitude, which runs through the Dakotas, Nebraska, Kansas, and western Oklahoma and Texas, and the Left Coast region. At times the Farm and Mountain states in this nation have also played a role in realignment.

NOTES

1. All election results in this book are referenced under “Election Results (2018).”
2. These groupings come in part from McPherson (1988).