List of contributors. Introduction (G.G. Kaufman). Part I. Market discipline in banking: Theory and evidence 1. Resolving large complex financial organizations (R. Bliss). The impact of supervisory disclosure on the supervisory process (R. Feldman, et al.). Market discipline: A theoretical framework for regulatory policy development (P. Hamalainen, et al.). International financial conglomerate and bank insolvency regimes (R. Herring). Comment (J. Bisignano). Comment (B.E. Gup). Comment (G.G. Kaufman). Comment (H. Rosenblum). Part II. Market discipline in banking: Theory and evidence 2. Market discipline and financial crisis policy: A historical perspective (M.D. Bordo). The role of market discipline in handling problem banks (D.T. Llewellyn, D.G. Mayes). Do un-insured depositors vote with their feet? (K. McDill, A.M. Maechler). Market discipline of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac: How do share prices and debt yield spreads, respond to new info? (R.S. Seiler, Jr.). Comment (L. Mote). Comment (R. van Order). Part III. Market discipline in banking: Role of supervisors and netting. Netting, financial contracts, and banks: The economic implications (B.Bergman, et al.). Inter-bank netting agreements and the distribution of bank default risk (W.R. Emmons). Do jumbo-cd holders care about anything? (J.R. Hall, et al.). Bank loan underwriting practices: Can supervisors' risk assessments, contribute to early warning systems? (C. Richardson, et al.). Comment (D. Evanoff). Comment (J.E McNulty).