This volume consists of nine papers that use experimental and theoretical tools to examine issues pertaining to charitable auctions and fundraising. In recent years, the revenue-generating effects of different fundraising techniques have been a subject of increasing policy interest as private, religious and state originations have come to rely increasingly on fundraising activities for revenues. Experimental methods provide an ideal context for conducting the dialogue between economists, fundraisers and policymakers regarding the revenue and social consequences of alternative fundraising methods. Themes explored in the volume include the structure of charity auctions, charity lotteries, fund drives as well as some of broader issues underlying charitable behaviour. It explores the structure of different fundraising and charitable programs. It is a valuable resource for economists, fundraisers and policymakers interested in the consequences of their fundraising efforts.
Preface: Revenue from the saints, the showoffs, and the predators: comparisons of auctions with price-preference values (T. Salmon, R. M. Isaac). 1. Sealed bid variations on the silent charity auction (R. M. Iaac, K. Schnier). 2. Raising revenues for charity: auctions versus lotteries (D. D. Davis, L. Razzolini, R.J. . Reilly, B. Wilson). 3. The optimal design of charitable lotteries: theory and experimental evidence (A. Lange, J.A. List, M.K. Price, S.M. Price). 4. Multiple public goods and lottery fundraising (R. Moir). 5. The impact of social comparisons on nonprofit fundraising (R. Croson, Y. Shang). 6. Do donors care about subsidy type: an experimental study (C.C. Eckel, P.J. Grossman) 7. Identifying altruism in the laboratory ( G. Harrison, L.T. Johnson). 8. The voluntary provision of a public good with binding multi-round commitments (M.A. HHalloran, J.M. Walker, A.W. Williams).