In this book, cognitive economics is understood either in a broad sense as the influence exerted by some achievements of cognitive science on economics, or in a more restricted sense as the study of mental and adaptation processes implemented by economic agents in their interactions. In response to some critics addressed to the rationality and equilibrium principles in classical economics, cognitive economics associates an epistemic program grounded on individual beliefs and reasoning and an evolutionist program concerned with learning processes in a social context. The book, which is the result of the first Conference about Cognitive Economics held in Europe, gives an overview of various recent achievements of cognitive economics and is intended to better define its motivations and its boundaries. The proposed articles deal with the individual deliberation process of a single decision-maker, the conjoint learning process of several players in a game, the coordination of heterogenous economic agents through beliefs as well as with applications to entrepreneurial behavior, consumer interactions or knowledge economics.These articles also illustrate the different tools and methods which are currently used in the domain and enlarge those traditionally used in economics, from analytical work to model simulations, from conceptual work to laboratory experiments. "Contributions to Economic Analysis" was established in 1952. The series purpose is to stimulate the international exchange of scientific information. The series includes books from all areas of macroeconomics and microeconomics.
Part 1 : Decision and beliefs Egidi, M. (University LUISS, Roma) : Decomposition patterns in problem solving Cozic M. (University Paris 4): Impossible states at work :Logical omniscience and rational choice Giraud R. (University Paris I) : Reference-dependent preferences : an axiomatic approach to the underlying cognitive process Kokinov B. (New Bulgarian University, Sofia) and Raeva D. (New Bulgarian University, Sofia): A cognitive approach to context effects on individual decision making under risk Part 2 : Games and evolution Germano F. (Universitat Pompeu Fabra, Barcelona : On boundedly rational rules for playing normal form games Durieu J. (University of Saint-Etienne), Haller H. (Virginia Polytechnic Institute) and Solal P. (University of West Britanny): Contagion and dominating sets Namatame A. (National Defense Academy, Yokosuka, Japan) : Selective interactions with reinforcing preference Part 3 : Economic applications Gordon M. (IMAG, Grenoble), Nadal J.-P. (ENS, Paris), Phan D. (ENST, Brest) and Semeshenko V. (IMAG, Grenoble) : Choice under social influence :effects of learning behaviors on the collective dynamics Pozzali, A. (University of Milan), Viale, R. (SSPA, Rome) : Cognition, types of tacit knowledge and technology transfer Hilton, D. (University of Toulouse II) : Overconfidence, trading and entrepreneurship : cognitive and cultural processes in risk-taking Epilogue : A. Kirman (University of Marseilles, Princeton University)