Written by leading experts in the field, each chapter in this book examines in depth a topic in law and economics. John Connor begins by describing and evaluating the results of his extensive survey of reports of cartel overcharges. Dennis Weisman models the price effects of mergers that not only increase concentration in the relevant market but also increase the merged firms' participation in other, complementary markets. Malcolm Coate and Mark Williams develop a superior method for calculating critical loss in markets that are relatively homogenous and competitive premerger. Zhiqi Chen surveys recent developments in economic theories of buyer power and creates a general framework for antitrust analysis. Finally Thomas J. Miceli and Kathern Segerson, given the difficulty of collecting damages after a long latency period, examine the desirability of granting toxic exposure victims an independent cause of action for medical monitoring at the time of exposure.They show that such a cause of action increase incentives for injurer care but only at the cost of greater litigation cost and the reluctance of courts to adopt such a proposed cause of action reflect their awareness of this trade-off.
Appointed to the Evans School in 1981, Professor Zerbe teaches environmental ethics, microeconomics, government regulation, law and economics and benefit cost analysis. He has an adjunct appointment with law. Professor Zerbe serves as a consultant to the Federal Trade Commission and other government agencies and is also editor of the research journal Research in Law and Economics. He has had appointments at the University of Chicago, the American Bar Foundation, a visiting appointment at Northwestern University and a fellowship to Yale Law School. He was on the executive board of the Western Economic Association and a founding member of the American Law and Economics Association when he also served on the board. He is author of over 100 publications.
Lays vs. Wages: Contracting in The Klondike Gold Rush Buyer Power: Economic Theory and Antitrust Policy Generalized Critical Loss for Market Definition Price-Fixing Overcharges: Legal and Economic Evidence Predatory Price Cutting and Standard Oil: A Re-Examination of the Trial Record On the optimal negligence standard in tort law when one party is a long-run and the other a short run player Should Victims of Exposure to a Toxic Substance Have an Independent Claim for Medical Monitoring? Market Concentration, Multi-Market Participation and Antitrust