This special volume is devoted to a single topic. In the past several years, many governments, including the United States and Canada, launched a major shift to what are sometimes called "incentive based" pollution control procedures. Because these proposed systems inherently required institutional design, they constituted a natural domain for laboratory experimental economics research.
Seven papers present laboratory experimental economics research relating to emissions permits. Papers focus on laboratory experiments evaluating the efficacy of the sulfur dioxide Emission Allowance market created by the U.S. ...Holt is in the Department of Economics at the University of Virginia. Journal of Economic Literature
List of contributors. Preface (C. Holt, R.M. Isaac). An experimental analysis of emission permits with banking and the clean air act amendments of 1990 (M.B. Cronshaw, J. Brown Kruse). Experimental research on the epa's "two-tier" system for marketable emissions permits (R. Franciosi, R.M. Isaac and S. Reynolds). A laboratory test of a Canadian proposal for an emissions trading program (S. Mestelman, R. Moir and R.A. Muller). Speculation in experimental markets for emission permits (T.N. Cason, S.R. Elliott and M.R. Van Boening). Market power in emission permit double auctions (R. Godby). Understanding experimental economics and policy analysis in a federal agency: the case of marketable emissions trading (D. Bjornstad, S.R. Elliott and D.R. Hale). Temporal properties of a market for emission permits with banking (M.B. Cronshaw, J. Brown Kruse).